Job Market Paper: “Do strategic communications predict rebel behavior in civil wars? Evidence from militant group manifestos“
How well do statements of political positions reflect actors' subsequent behavior in civil wars? Existing research on legislative dynamics indicates a relationship between elected officials' expressions and voting behavior, but it is unclear whether this relationship generalizes to other domains. In this paper, I examine the relationship between the sentiments expressed in manifestos released by militant groups involved in civil wars and the sources of revenue that such organizations opt for. To the extent that existing research on civil wars considers revenue sources, it is largely as an independent variable that influences the probability and nature of conflict occurrence. I propose to re-conceptualize funding decisions as outcomes of militants' efforts to navigate tradeoffs within their political environments that may be reflected in their formal communications. In particular, I examine whether rebel groups collect revenue directly from constituents, indirectly through means such as drug sales, or via transfers from foreign governments. Using text analysis on an original corpus of manifestos, I derive ideological position estimates for a sample of militant groups. I then combine multiple sources of data on rebel revenue gathering to assess the relationship between the positions taken and revenue-gathering decisions. In partial support of my hypotheses, I find that groups whose manifestos reflect a more international orientation do indeed tend to take more foreign contributions. The relationship between stated positions and domestic forms of funding is more ambiguous. The results have implications both for future policymaking and scholarship on militant group behavior.
Publications
Becker, Michael. (In press) “Futile or farsighted? Domestic politics, leader replacement, and the nature of lopsided conflicts.” Defence and Peace Economics.
Becker, Michael. (In press) “Cyclicality in Non-State Violence: Theory and Evidence.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression.
Becker, Michael. (2017) “Why Violence Abates: Imposed and Elective Declines in Terrorist Attacks.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 29(2), pp. 215-235.
Becker, Michael. (2016) “A Response to "Key Issues and Research Agendas in Lone Wolf Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 39(5), pp. 472–476.
Becker, Michael, Matthew S. Cohen, Sidita Kushi, and Ian McManus. (2016) “Reviving the Russian Empire: The Crimean Intervention through a Neoclassical Realist Lens.” European Security, 25(1), pp. 112-133.
Becker, Michael. (2015). “When Terrorists and Target Governments Cooperate: the Case of Syria.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 9(1), pp. 95-103.
Becker, Michael. (2014) “Explaining Lone Wolf Target Selection in the United States.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 37(11), pp. 959-978.
Working papers and in preparation
“War on Two Fronts: How Rebels Choose between Foreign and Domestic Audiences.”
Abstract: What do rebel communications reveal about militants’ target selection behavior? Some organizations primarily target civilians, while others attack government forces; some groups are domestically-focused, while others perpetrate violence on foreign soil. Explaining and predicting such behavior by militant organizations is important on both analytical and policy-relevant grounds. However, existing classifications based on qualitative estimations of ideology have failed to adequately explain variation in target selection behavior. In this paper, using a novel measure, I demonstrate that political communications in civil wars are reflective of target selection behavior. Organizations attempt to align with either a domestic or an international audience, and the observable tactical outcomes of this decision (domestic vs. foreign attacks, civilian vs. government targets) are mediated by organizational capacity. Internationally-aligned organizations tend to be agents of foreign sponsors who fund campaigns to advance their interests abroad. Sponsors wish to induce their clients to target government forces, but have imperfect influence. I conjecture that internationally-oriented organizations will be more likely to target hardened government or military targets and, on a separate dimension, foreign nationals. Locally-oriented groups, on the other hand, tend to embark on parochial, often ethnically-focused campaigns, and direct violence against their domestic, mainly civilian enemies. To shed light on how militant groups perceive the interaction between decisions on these two dimensions, I collect a corpus of rebel manifestos, which express organizations' grievances, goals, and intended strategies. I then extract relative text-based position estimates for each organization, and link these estimates with existing data on target selection behavior. The findings conform to the theoretical expectations.
“The Logic of Funding Mechanisms in Civil Wars.”
Abstract: I construct a game-theoretic framework to help understand the tradeoffs inherent in militants’ funding decisions. More specifically, using a signaling model, I consider how a rebel group with an exogenously established, but tenuously loyal “base” positions itself with respect to that base and a potential foreign sponsor. The militant group faces a series of tradeoffs when attempting to appeal to either. The foreign sponsor can offer significant resources, and quickly, but may undermine the credibility of the group, or demand exorbitant policy concessions in ex- change for support. On the other hand, extracting from local constituents may be insufficient, or can sap domestic support. Finally, organizations may attempt to exploit natural resource or trafficking opportunities that do not impose directly on their “base.” Doing so is risky, however, since it often takes significant time and investment up-front, and tarnishes the group in the eyes of constituents. I explore these tradeoffs with an eye to generating testable hypotheses for future research.
“Fraternity or Fratricide? Rebel Cooperation, Conflict, and Relative Effort Levels in Civil War.”
Abstract: Despite being in a precarious military position, in many civil wars like-minded rebel organizations attack each other instead of pooling their resources---an empirical regularity that is in search of a coherent explanation. This study provides a formally-derived theory explaining inter-rebel conflict, as well as relative effort levels. I find that though power dynamics among insurgents do matter, the effect is mediated by the strength of the rebel movement as a whole. More powerful movements are more likely to cooperate while weak movements, which face probable defeat in any case, might as well attempt a ``gamble for resurrection.'' I also offer a formal series of predictions about groups' relative effort levels that are consonant with the historical record. The results have important implications for scholarship on sub-national conflict.
“Measuring Militant Ideology Through Manifestos.”